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Chapter 3
Criteria for Evaluating
Social Security Reform
Joseph F Quinn
Because of its long-range funding deficit, reform of social security is inevita-
ble. This is one of the themes of this volume. Some combination of in-
creased revenues and decreased or delayed benefits is necessary. It is not a
matter of "if" reform will occur, but rather of when and how it will occur.
There is much debate on the appropriate timing of reform legislation
and implementation. Some argue that there is no need to legislate reform
now, both because the long-range liability prediction is based on a 75-year
forecast (and therefore is subject to considerable uncertainty) and because,
even if this forecast turns out to be accurate, the OASDI trust funds will not
be depleted for over three decades. Seventy-five years ago was 1923. Even
economists, usually willing to predict anything, anytime, anywhere, would
have been hard pressed to forecast the last 75 years with much accuracy'
Why institute reform, especially radical reform, say some, to solve a problem
that may turn out to be considerably less serious than it appears to be today?l
And even if the problem remains, will not future generations, with more
and better information than we have today, be in a better position to decide
on the best alternative? Others point out, however, that there should be a
significant lag between legislation and implementation, to allow citizens to
adjust to the new environment, and that whatever reform changes are intro-
duced can be smaller the sooner they are implemented. Both points argue
for prompt legislative action.
Whatever the timing, there are many ways that revenues can be raised or
future benefits curtailed. The Technical Panel (1997) described, discussed
and evaluated a number of them for the Advisory Council on Social Se-
curity. Future benefits could be lowered by raising the normal retirement
age (which is nearly equivalent to an across-the-board benefit cut), adjusting
benefits at less than the cost-of-living, means-testing benefits or by changing
the initial benefit calculation formula. Additional revenues could be gener-
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ated by raising the payroll tax rate, raising the earnings limit on which these
taxes apply, expanding the definition of taxable income (for example, to
include the value of some employee benefits), subjecting more social se-
curity benefits to federal income taxation, adding general tax revenues to
the system, including all new state and local government employees in the
program, or investing some of the trust fund reserves in equities.
The last Advisory Council on Social Security (1997) has provided a frame-
work for debate on these issues by presenting three very different visions of
social security's future, each of which addresses the long-range deficit.~The
three plans are described in the introductory chapter of this volume. The
Maintain Benefits (MB) plan would preserve the current structure of the so-
cial security system, and rely primarily on revenue increases (as has usually
been done in the past) to finance the benefits that have been promised. The
Individual Accounts (IA) proposal would also maintain the basic structure
of the social security program, but would rely more on benefit decreases to
balance future finances. The IA plan would also add a new and very con-
troversial component-mandatory, defined-<ontribution, individual retire-
ment accounts over which individuals would have some management discre-
tion. The third option, the Personal Security Accounts (PSA) plan, would
also mandate individual savings accounts (but much larger ones than in the
IA proposal, with funds diverted from the current payroll tax stream), and
proposes fundamental changes in the basic structure of the social security
system. The PSA plan would replace traditional earnings-related social secu-
rity benefits with a two-tiered system - a lower tier, flat-rate benefit, indepen-
dent of earnings, and an upper tier, defined-contribution, mandatory sav-
ings account, over which individuals would have considerable management
discretion, both during the accumulation and the distribution of the assets.
How does one choose among these or any other social security reform
proposals? Rational discussion of alternatives requires a framework for
analysis - a set ofcriteria against which the proposals can be compared. The
purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss a range of such criteria.
The Roles and Goals of the Social Security Program
The criteria used to evaluate a social security program or proposed changes
in it depend on its goals. In the U.S., the over-arching goal is a straightfor-
ward one - to improve the economic secUlity of current and future recip-
ients, primarily retirees, but also survivors and the disabled. The debate
concerns how best to achieve this goal.
The Importance of Social Security Income
Social security benefits are the most important of four principal income
sources upon which older Americans rely, and are more than twice as impor-
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TABLE 1. Income Shares for Aged Units Aged 65 or Older by Age and Income
Quintile, 1994 (%)
At;e
Saure.e ofIncom.e Total 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
Social Security 42 31 43 48 56 57
Earnings 18 33 16 8 5 2
Employer Pensions 19 18 21 20 17 13
Income from Assets 18 15 17 20 19 22
Other 4 4 3 4 3 5
Income Quintile
Source ofIncome Total First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Social Security 42 81 81 66 48 23
Earnings 18 0 2 6 11 29
Employer Pensions 19 3 7 14 24 21
Income from Assets 18 3 5 10 14 24
Other 4 13 4 4 3 3
Source: Grad (1996), tables VII.1 and VII.5.
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Figure 1. Income shares for aged units age 65 or older, 1994. Source: Grad (1996),
Table VII. I.
tant as the next SOUlTe. Almost all- 91 percent - of all household units
aged 65 or older received social security benefits, and this single source
provided 42 percent of their total cash income in 1994 (see Table 1 and
Figure 1). Three other sources each provided about one-fifth of the aggre-
gate income: employer pensions (19 percent), earnings (18 percent) and
asset income, ptimarily interest and dividends (18 percent).3 Two-thirds of
all older household units received some asset income, but many had only
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Figure 2. Income shares for aged units by age, 1994. Source: Grad (1996), Table
VIII.l.
Joseph F. Quinn 41
small amounts. About 40 percent of these households received pension
income, and about one-fifth reported earnings (Grad 1996).
The aggregate importance of social security benefits differs dramatically
by the age and income status of the recipient. The social security share of
total income increases monotonically from 31 percent for those aged 65 to
69 to 56 percent for those aged 80 or older (see Table 1 or Figure 2).
Earnings drop dramatically over the same age range, from about a third of
total income (for those aged 65 to 69) to less than 5 percent (at ages 80 or
older). The shares from asset income and from employer pension benefits
are more stable over this age range.
Among the poorest two quintiles of Americans aged 65 or over, social
security benefits provided 81 percent ofall cash income in 1994 (see Table 1
and Figure 3). For the lowest quintile, public assistance provided another 11
percent, leaving only 8 percent from all other sources.
Those with earnings or pension benefits are rarely found in the lowest
quintile. Among those in the highest quintile, in contrast, social security
benefits provided less than a quarter of aggregate income in 1994. Earnings
(29 percent) was the most important source in this quintile, followed by
asset income (24 percent), social security benefits (23 percent) and em-
ployer pension benefits (21 percent).
The importance of social security benefits has been increasing, although
not steadily, over time. In 1962, social security benefits provided only 31
percent of aggregate income for older Americans (Grad 1997). After the
large increases in real social security benefits in the late 1960s and early
1970s, the share increased and then remained stable - in the 36 to 39 per-
cent range between 1976 and 1990. Since 1990, the share has increased
again, from 36 percent to 42 percent (1994).
The message here is that social security benefits are a very important
component of the financial well-being of most older Americans, especially
the poor and the very old. At the same time, however, other sources do
provide nearly 60 percent of the aggregate income of those 65 and older,
and over three-quarters for those in the top quintilc. Thorough analysis
must include not only the direct effects of reform on social security benefi ts,
but also any indirect impacts that reform proposals might have on these
other important sources of income - earnings, pensions and income from
accumulated savings.
The Goals of Social Security
The U.S. social security system is a complex institution that plays many roles
simultaneously. In some ways, it behaves like a mandatory savings program, a
savings account, or a pension. Like these other instruments, it reallocates
income over time, taking contributions during one's working years and
then paying benefits during retirement. It is also an insurance program, like
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fire or automobile insurance, since it replaces some of the income lost
following the disability or death of a covered worker, and thereby cushions
the household's economic decline. Finally, the social security system is a
very important income redistribution program, like the federal income tax and
transfer system. Its progressive benefit structure transfers income from
high-earning to low-earning participants, both within and between genera-
tions. Of all the federal transfer programs, it is the only one that explic-
itly bases the transfer on a life-time measure of economic status - average
monthly earnings over most of an individual's working life.
These multiple roles create multiple goals, and changes therefore require
multiple evaluation criteria. The insurance and income redistribution roles
suggest that income adequacy should be a concern. Are benefits sufficient for
recipients to maintain some minimum standard of living? The savings as-
pect, on the other hand, suggests individual equity as an appropriate crite-
rion. What is the relationship between what an individual contributes to the
system and what that individual can expect to receive in return? What is the
rate of return? Is it a good investment?
The size of the social security system suggests that it might also have
important macroeconomic effects. It can affect the economic decisions of
individuals, firms, and the government, and therefore can influence the
rate of economic growth of the economy. Since future retirees will not be
directly consuming social security checks or trust fund reserves, but rather
the goods and services actually being produced during their retirement, the
productive capacity of the economy in the future will be a key determinan t
ofthe economic well-being of workers and retirees alike.
Other important considerations discussed below include the administra-
tive costs of proposed reforms, the impact of reform on public confidence
in the social security program, and the complexity and ease of transition of
reform. One must also consider the general equilibrium effects of reform
on other sources of retirement income - employer pension benefi ts, asset
income, and earnings. Finally, it is important to assess the impact of chang-
ing a program as important as social security on social cohesiveness.
We take up these issues next, taking as a starting poin t the criteria pro-
posed by the Advisory Council's Technical Panel on Trends and Issues in
Retirement Savings (1997).
Evaluation Criteria
Income Adequacy
The United States social security system grew out of the experiences of
the Great Depression in which unemployment and old-age poverty were
widespread. Legislative leaders became convinced that the nation was best
served by the introduction of a national old-age retirement program based
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on the principles of social insurance.' A primary goal was to assist in the
provision of income security in retirement, without the stigma of a public
assistance or welfare system.
Social insurance usually has a number of characteristics (Thompson and
Upp 1997). It is mandatory for certain categories of individuals (e.g., work-
ers), sponsored, regulated and in some cases managed by the government,
and is financed by contributions from the eventual beneficiaries (or their
family members). The contributions determine eligibility and sometimes
the benefits levels, which are set by law. These characteristics allow the
system to avoid the adverse selection problems of private insurance (i.e., the
poorer risks are more likely to want the insurance coverage), and permit
explicit income redistribution between or within cohorts of participants,
something which is difficult to do in a voluntary or privatized system.
Without social security benefits, many older Americans would enter their
retirement years without adequate income. Some have lived in or near pov-
erty all their lives, have had irregular work histories without pension cov-
erage, and have been unable to save on their own. Others have been myopic,
and have either refused to consider the savings needed to support con-
sumption in retirement or miscalculated what would be required. Others
may have had bad luck, hampered by limited personal endowments or by
being in a profession whose skills became obsolete, or in an industry or a
geographic location doomed to economic decline. Social insurance is de-
signed to dampen the economic implications of any of these unfortunate
circumstances.
Through 1950, social security in the U.S. was less important than means-
tested old-age assistance, measured by either the number of recipients or
the total benefits distributed (Berkowitz 1997). Amendments in 1950, how-
ever, increased the social security program's coverage and benefit levels, as
well as the tax rates and the taxable earnings base. Since then, it has been
much more important than public assistance in supporting the elderly. Dis-
ability benefits were added in 1956. The program continued to expand
during the 1960s and 1970s and is now the first line of defense against
economic distress among older Americans.
Although social security benefits were never designed to be a sole source
ofsupport, income adequacy remains the primary and most important crite-
rion by which to judge the success of the program. Income adequacy should
be considered with respect to old age, survivors and disability recipients.
Income adequacy can be measured in at least two ways: relative to one's
prior income (for example, a replacement rate) or relative to some absolute
measure of need, like the U.S. poverty threshold. One of the program's
greatest accomplishments has been the dramatic reduction in elderly pov-
erty, from about 30 percent (and twice the national average) in 1967, to half
that rate only seven years later, following large inueases in real social se-
curity benefits beginning in 1968. This decline occurred during a time
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when Americans were retiring earlier and earlier, making the progress all
the more remarkable. Since 1982, the elderly poverty rate has been slightly
below that of the en tire population.
Neither replacement rates nor poverty indices are perfect measures of
income adequacy. A replacement rate is static in nature. It compares retire-
ment income in the first year of retirement to earnings the year before, and
ignores changes in income flows thereafter. Depending on whether or not
income flows (such as employer pension benefits) are indexed to inflation,
a given initial replacement rate could be associated with very different levels
of economic well-being later on.
The American poverty concept is an absolute measure, based on the cost
of a particular basket ofconsumption goods. Although the cost of the basket
is adjusted for price changes, the market basket itself is not adjusted for the
changes in the overall standard ofliving that occur over time as real incomes
rise. Nonetheless, both the replacement rate and the poverty rate are useful
summary statistics.
The analysis of any reform proposal should address the likely impacts on
the replacement rates of future recipients - retirees, survivors and the
disabled - by income level. Who is likely to gain and who is likely to lose
from the changes proposed? The analysis should pay particular atten tion to
those at the lower end of the income distribution, those most dependen ton
the income redistribution built into the social security benefit structure.
A closely related issue is that of risk - who will bear the risk if the forecasts
of the future turn out to be inaccurate, as they undoubtedly will? In a
defined benefit plan, the risk falls primarily on whoever defined the bene-
fit- the government (and therefore the taxpayers) in the case of social
security, or the firm sponsoring an employer pension plan. In a defined
contribution plan, the financial risk of disappointing performance falls on
the individual. Analysis of reform proposals should consider not only the
most likely forecast, but also the income adequacy implications ofa range of
future economic scenarios.
These forecasts are difficult, particularly when projected many years into
the future and especially if they include anticipated stock market returns!'
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that changes in the social security
system may well result in changes in the other sources of future income
(earnings, employer pension benefits, and asset income), as employers and
individuals respond to the new social security environmen t.
Individual Equity
vVhereas income adequacy is the oldest (and, I would argue, the most im-
portant) criterion for evaluating the social security program, individual eq-
uity may be the newest. This criterion takes an individual rather than a social
insurance perspective, and analyzes the relationship between an individ-
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ual's total contributions to the system (the payroll tax paid by the employee
and employer) and the total benefits that he or she is likely to receive in
return.
Historically, individual equity has not been an important part of the social
security debate. One reason is that before the system matured, all cohorts of
retirees received several times what their (and their employers') contribu-
tions would have produced had the funds been invested in similarly safe
investments, such as government bonds. Favorable demographics- the
high ratio of social security contributors to beneficiaries in the early years of
the program - coupled with significant real wage growth permitted gen-
erous benefits to retirees withoUl undue burden on workers and employers."
Because of the progressive nature and the gender neutrality of the benefit
structure, the "rate of return" varied with income level (it is higher the
lower one's average lifetime earnings) and gendel- (since women live longer
than men).7 But social security proved to be a good "investment" for all
types ofcurrent and prior retirees, and therefore individual equity was not a
bone ofcontention.
But this will not be the case for future cohorts of retirees. Because of the
changing demographics, the aging of the population, and the decline in the
ratio ofsocial security contributors to recipients, rates of return from social
security are falling. Steuerle and Bakija (1994) estimate that the net transfer
for average- and high-wage single males has already turned negative, and
will do so for high-wage single females and high-wage two-earner couples
turning 65 in the years 2000 and 2005 respectively."
In 2030, when the youngest of the baby-boomers will have reached 65,
high-wage single men can expect to receive from OASI less than halfofwhat
their and their employers' contributions could have provided had they been
invested at a 2 percent real rate of return (Steuerle and Bakija 1994). For
high-wage females and high-wage two-earner couples, analogous figures in
2030 are about 60 and 75 percentY The absolute size of the expected net
transfers from these individuals to social security (the difference between
the value of the expected OASI benefits and the proceeds from investment)
at a 2 percent real rate of return, are large - approximately $250,000 (in
1993 dollars), $190,000 and $180,000 for high-wage single males, single
females and two-earner couples, respectively, who turn 65 in 2030 (Steuerle
and Bakija 1994). The negative transfers are slightly larger for subsequent
cohorts.
To many young workers, therefore, participation in the social security
system no longer looks like a good investment. It is not surprising that
"money's worth" calculations are now part of the reform debate and that
they have engendered some adverse reactions to the traditionally very popu-
lar social security system.
The comparison here is between expected lifetime social security contri-
butions and benefits, and the goal is a closer relation between the two.
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According to this individual equity criterion, the social security system
should look more like a savings account or an Individual Retirement Ac-
count, and less like the income redistributional system that is designed to
be. In evaluating reform options, analysts should compare the expected
internal rates of return (or the net transfers) of proposed changes with
those under the current system, both across generations (that is, by age
cohort) and by income class and demographic type within generations. 1O
Economic Growth
Social security expenditures are the largest single item in the federal bud-
get. In 1996, social security outlays, excluding Medicare, totaled $354 bil-
lion, nearly a quarter of all federal government expenditures, and nearly 5
percent ofgross domestic product. Old-age, survivors and disability benefits
were paid to 44 million recipients, and payrOll taxes were collected from 144
million workers (Board of Trustees 1997). Changes in a program of this
magnitude can have significant macroeconomic effects and can influence
the growth rate of the economy.
As mentioned above, economic growth is of paramount importance, be-
cause the consumption of future retirees will come from the goods and
services being produced at that time. Social security benefits and other
sources of retiree income will provide a claim on those future goods and
services. Much of the discussion about social security reform focuses on the
distribution of future output - the share that retirees wiII or should have. As
important as the share of the pie, however, is the size of the pie being
shared. I I
There are two primary ways in which the social security program can
affect economic growth: through its influence on individual labor-leisure
choices, and through its impact on aggregate national saving.
Individual labor-leisure choice. The social security system can affect labor
supply decisions through the typical income and substitution effects, both
during the work life and, more importantly, at retirement. To the extent that
participation in the system increases the lifetime wealth ofparticipants, as it
has for the vast majority of current and previous retirees, it should increase
the consumption of all normal goods, including leisure. Much of this in-
creased leisure has been taken late in life, in tile form of earlier retirement.
Research suggests that increases in social security wealth may be responsible
for about one-third of the post-war decline in elderly labor force participa-
tion rates. 12
But social security taxes and benefits also affect the net wage rate earned
by current workers. To the extent that employees view their mandatory
OASDI contribution as a tax, it lowers the marginal wage rate for those
earning below the maximum taxable earnings. 13 This could have a dislOr-
tionary effect on labor supply, although evidence suggests that it is a small
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one, at least for primary workers (Council of Economic Advisors 1997).
Once one is eligible for social security benefits, however, the incentives
get more complicated. After age 62, additional earnings over the exempt
amount have two offsetting effects. 14 They decrease current benefits (to
zero, if earnings are high enough), but they also increase the future benefit
stream, both because of the recalculation of average earnings and because
of the delayed retirement credit. Depending on one's discount rate, life
expectancy, and average lifetime earnings, the net result could be an in-
crease or a decrease in expected total benefits - an increase or decrease in
lifetime social security wealth. One's true compensation during the year of
work includes both the paycheck and the change (the increase or decrease)
in social security wealth. If the total amount of expected lifetime social
security benefits declines with additional work, then social security acts as
a tax, or a pay cut. To the extent that additional work provides both a
paycheck and an increase in lifetime benefits, social security acts as a sub-
sidy, and increases true compensation. Considerable research has shown
that workers do respond to these incentives, and that they are more likely to
leave a job and often the labor force as well, the stronger the retirement
incentives (the implicit pay cuts) they face.'5
Reform proposals that either tighten the relationship between contribu-
tions and benefits or make the benefit calculation rules at retirement more
age-neutral (i.e., the total expected value offuture benefits does not depend
on when benefits are first claimed) reduce the labor market distortions of
the system, and would be viewed favorably according to this criterion.
Individual consumption-saving choice. Social security rules can influence not
only the allocation of time between work and leisure, as discussed above. but
also the allocation of income between consumption and saving. Many ana-
lysts believe that Americans save too little, both from a macroeconomic
perspective and with respect to maintaining consumption levels after retire-
ment. Americans save less than they used to, and less than the citizens of
many other industrialized countries.'n
Economic theory and common sense (synonyms, according to some!)
suggest that the public provision of retirement income should affect the
amount of discretionary private saving that individuals will do on their own
for retirement. The higher the social security benefits promised or the level
of private saving mandated (as proposed in two of the Advisory Council
plans), other things equal, the less one has to save through other means to
maintain a given standard of living. But other things may not be equal.
Retirement decisions are affected by the generosity of social security bene-
fits (the net transfer from the system to the individual), which creates an
offsetting effect. An increase in benefits and therefore an earlier planned
labor market exit could induce an increase in private saving to finance the
additional years of retirement (Council of Economic Advisors 1997).
The theoretical effect of the social security system on private saving is
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ambiguous, as is the empirical literature." Some authors have found sub-
stantial negative impacts on pl;vate saving (Feldstein 1974), while others
have found small or no impacts (Munnell 1974; Danziger, Haveman, and
Plotnick 1981). This same ambiguity is found in the related literature on the
impact of government savings incentives, such as favorable IRA and 401 (k)
tax provisions, on net private savings. Some authors find considerable net
new saving, while others, sometimes analyzing the same data, find that the
saving in these vehicles is just a reallocation of saving that would have oc-
curred in other forms. I~
Regardless of the difficulty of measuring it, the impact of proposed social
security reforms on private saving decisions is an important evaluation cl'i-
terion, because the sign and magnitude of the effect will influence the
amount of asset income that individuals can rely on in retirement, the
amount ofcapital accumulation, and therefore the future productive capac-
ity of the economy at large.
Aggregate national saving. Private saving by individuals is only one part of
aggregate saving. Another key component is federal government saving,
through the social security program directly and through the rest of the
federal budget.
The social security system is currently running large surpluses. In 1996,
an OASDI surplus of $71 billion was added to trust fund reserves. This
lowered the official federal government deficit by the same amount. The
annual OASDI surpluses are scheduled to increase to about $130 billion per
year early next century, and then fall, turning negative by about 2019, ac-
cording to the intermediate forecasts in the Trustees Report (1997). Antici-
pated revenues and withdrawals from OASDI reserves would then be suffi-
cient to pay benefits until the year 2029.
Social security reform could change government saving in two ways: by
directly affecting the revenue or expenditure stream of social security, and
by indirectly affecting other government decisions. For example, reform
proposals that reduce social securitysurpluses (e.g., by diverting some of the
revenue stream into mandatory individual savings accounts) would increase
the measured government deficit. How would the federal government re-
spond to the increased deficit? Would Congress attempt to maintain the
current budget deficit path by reducing spending or raising other taxes to
replace the diverted revenue stream? If so, this would represent an increase
in aggregate savings. Or would Congress slow the time path to budget bal-
ance, by maintaining current expenditure and taxation plans and borrow-
ing the diverted funds from the market (from the individuals themselves)
rather than from the social security trust funds? Tn the latter case, the
measured increase in private saving (the new savings accounts) would be
offset by the increase in government dissaving, and national saving would
remain unchanged. 1"
Forecasts of this type are extremely difficult, because they require predic-
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tions of future Congressional behavior. Nonetheless, they should be in-
cluded in the discussion, because the behavioral decisions made could have
significant effects on aggregate national saving and therefore on future
economic growth.
Administrative Costs
Because of the large scale and the mandatory nature of the social security
system, administrative costs are very low, less than 1 percent of benefits paid
in 1996 (Board of Trustees 1997). Two of the three reform options pro-
posed by the Advisory Council (1997) include the creation of mandatory
individual retirement accounts over which participants would have some
management discretion.
Mitchell (1996) has estimated the administrative costs that might accom-
pany alternatives to the current social security system by analyzing the ad-
ministrative costs of mutual funds and defined-<:ontribution employer pen-
sions, such as 40 I (k) plans. She argues that the additional costs of investing
some of the social security Trust Fund reserves in the equities market (as
proposed by the Maintain Benefits plan) would be very small, as long as the
investment strategy remained passive and political pressures to favor or
avoid particular industries or stocks were resisted."" On the other hand,
proposals that involve the investment ofmandated saving by individuals, like
the Personal Security Accounts plan, could result in considerably higher
administrative and management costs, depending on the details of the plan;
for example, the breadth of investment options allowed, the frequency of
asset reallocations permitted, the extent to which the new saving accounts
were added to existing mutual funds or 401 (k) plans, and whether the
accumulated assets could eventually be withdrawn in a lump sum or had to
be converted into an annuity."' Mitchell (1998) points out that these addi-
tional costs would notjust be new fees for the same service (i.e., a pure cost
increase), but rather would be associated with new investment and portfolio
options for participants.
In analyzing the three reform proposals, the Advisory Council (1997)
assumed administrative costs of 0.5 basis points per year for the Maintain
Benefits plan, 10.5 basis points for the passively-managed Individual Ac-
counts plan, and 100 basis points or 1 percent per year for the Personal
Security Accounts plan. Flexible investment options offer advantages but
they come at a cost, and both should be considered when evaluating these
or any other social security reform proposals.
Confidence in the Social Security System
Public opinion polls suggest a widespread lack of confidence in social se-
cu.-ity. A 1994 EBRI/Gallup poll, for instance, showed that 43 percent of
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those surveyed stated that they were "not confident" that social security
income would be available throughout their retirement years (Reno and
Friedland 1997). Analogous numbers for employer pensions (24 percent)
and personal savings (19 percent) were much lower, indicating more confi-
dence in those retirement income components. There were also large dif-
ferences by age. For respondents under the age of 55, over half were "not
confident" in the social security program, compared to only 16 percent of
those aged 55 or older.
Further investigation clouds the interpretation of these responses, how-
ever, since in an earlier (1991) EBRl / Gallup survey, 93 percent of the re-
spondents said that they expected to receive social security benefits, and
nearly half (45 percent) expected they would be "a major source" of their
retirement income (Reno and Friedland 1997: 188). (Only27 percent ex-
pected social security benefits to be their "most important" source of in-
come.) In addition, many people support the social security program, even
if they harbor some doubts about its future viability. For instance a 1994 poll
found that 80 percent of people not receiving social security benefits said
that they favored or strongly favored the fact that "part of every working
person's income goes to support the social security program," and nearly
three-{juarters opposed a decrease in spending on social security benefits
(Reno and Friedland 1997: 186).
Irrespective of whether these survey results reflect snap reactions or
thoughtful judgments, they are a matter of concern, since the future of
the social security system depends on the political support of the electo-
rate. Hence any reform must be assessed in terms of the likely impact it
would have on public confidence, both through the financial details of the
proposal and through the effects of any educational components that it
might include.
CompleXity and Ease ofTransition
Although some of the details of the social security program are compli-
cated, Americans have a good general understanding of its goals and fea-
tures. Most know that social security benefits are based on earnings and are
financed by payroll taxes, that curren t taxes largely pay for current benefi ts,
and that benefits are not directly means-tested (Reno and Friedland 1997:
183). As noted above, the vast majority claim that they expect social security
benefits to be part of their incomes in retirement.
Reform will revise the current rules, as it must. An important consider-
ation is the nature of the transition from the current system to whatever
replaces it. Those nearing retirement age should be protected from sudden
and dramatic changes in what they hav~ been led to expect}" And for all
participants, young and old, one should consider the complexity of any
proposal, and ask whether citizens can be expected to understand the im-
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portant parameters of the new system. It may be more difficult to maiI1lain
political support for a system whose features are only vaguely understood by
the population.
Changes in Employer Pension Plans
Because of the magnitude of the social security system and the number of
participants and beneficiaries, changes in the system can be expected to
have impacts in other pans of the retirement environment and in the econ-
omy as a whole. The private savings responses of individuals and the behav-
ioral responses of Congress to possible changes in the federal budget deficit
were mentioned above. Equally important are the responses of employers
through their pension plans.23 Since pension benefits are a key componeI1l
of retirement income (about half as important as social security benefits, in
the aggregate) and because pension receipt is rarely associated with poverty,
changes in pensions in response to social security reform could have impor-
tant implications for the economic well-being of the elderly."
Some response to changes in social security benefits would be automatic
under current rules, because nearly two-thirds of full-time pension partici-
pants are in plans that are formally integrated with social security (Mitchell
1992).25 This means either that pension benefits are directly reduced by
some proportion of social security benefits received, or that the pension
formula applies a lower rate to earnings that are subject to social security tax
than to earnings that are not. Unless these rules were changed, part of any
social security benefit decrease would be automatically offset fm' some pen-
sion recipients.
Of more interest, however, are the discretionary changes that might fol-
low social security reform. Would a decline in the size of social security's
defined benefit (e.g., as in the Personal Security Account plan) increase the
demand by employees for defined benefit employer pensions? Would a
universally mandated defined contribution plan result in a decrease in the
number of these plans at work, or a decrease in the matching rate offered by
employers? Would employees contribute less to these plans, even if they
were still available? In general, anyone already saving can offset at least
part of any new saving mandate, by simply saving less elsewhere. 26 One
"elsewhere" is in the discretionary component of employer-based pension
saving.
Since private and institutional savings (through the social security system
or through employer pension plans) are all means to the same end, it is
plausible that there would be offsetting effects to major social security re-
form. It is difficult to predict what would happen to the structure of em-
ployer pensions or to the total contributions of employers and employees,
but the impact ofany such changes could be very important.
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Social Cohesiveness
Social security is one of the few programs in which nearly all Americans
participate, either directly as workers or indirectly as spouses or dependents
enjoying survivors insurance. Many analysts have lamented the decline of
common purpose in the United States.27 An important criterion for consid-
eration is what effect particular reforms would have on the viability of the
social security program in the future.
Opponents and proponents of radical reform acknowledge the impor-
tance of this issue, but to opposite purpose. Those opposed to the partial
privatization component that exists in two of the three Advisory Council
plans fear the long-run political implications of formally separating the
social security program into two parts. They foresee the development of
one component of primary interest to the poor - the defined benefit part,
the means of redistribution - and another part of primary interest to the
middle and upper classes - the defined contribution, mandatory saving
part.28 They wonder if the defined benefit part would take on a welfare
aura, like Supplemental Security Income, especially in the PSA plan, where
the income redistribution occurs through a flat-rate benefit, independent
of earnings. If the public perception of this component does change, pri-
vatization opponents worry that the social insurance aspect of the pro-
gram, its original reason for existence, will atrophy over time, and higher
and higher proportions of the payroll tax would be moved into the upper
tier.
Proponents of privatization, on the other hand, claim that political sup-
port for the current social security system will inevitably decline over time, as
it becomes a poor investment for more and more involuntary participants.
They argue that continued political support for the system requires radical
change - the replacement of the old engines of population and real wage
growth with the new engine of the equities market.
Whomever is right, I suspect that these long-range political issues will turn
out to be as important to the well-being of future retirees as are the eco-
nomic forecasts of benefit levels under the various reform proposals.
The Financial Health of the Social Security System
This was the last of the six criteria adopted by the Advisory Council's Techni-
cal Panel (1997). It is obviously important, since the unfunded liability
facing the system is largely what prompted this round of interest in social
security reform. Any proposal for change should be analyzed for its long-
range fiscal implications. Since all of the Advisory Council's proposals would
eliminate the 75-year unfunded liability, given the assumptions, this crite-
rion will not help us differentiate among these three, but it may distinguish
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them from other reform plans that do not achieve this goal, or even move us
further away from it.
Conclusion
Because of the favorable age distribution of the population during the ma-
turing of the American social security system - the high ratio of contribu-
tors to beneficiaries - the program was able to make a major contribution
toward the economic security of low-earning workers while simultaneously
providing an outstanding financial return on the contributions of all co-
horts ofAmericans, rich and poor alike. In the future, however, this will not
be possible, and the inherent tension between the goals of income adequacy
and individual equity will become clear. Income redistribution explicitly
treats different people differen tly - that is the poin t of it. The primary goal
of the social security system, income adequacy for its recipients, must now
be balanced against the political implications of a mandatory program in
which certain citizens can expect to be significant net contributors over
their lifetimes.
The social security system should not be viewed solely as a savings vehicle.
Social insurance provides more than an individual return on investment. It
provides to individuals insurance against certain risks, and to society some
protection against the inequalities and inequities that are inevitable in an
advanced capitalistic state. These considerable benefits must be weighed
against their costs, and under the current rules, these costs differ signifi-
cantly by income class.
In this chapter, I have discussed various criteria by which to evaluate
proposals for social security reform, including income adequacy, individual
equity, economic growth, the complexity and administrative costs of any
new system, its effects on public confidence and social cohesiveness, and
how other components of income security in old age, particularly employer-
sponsored pensions, would be likely to change. Most analysts would agree
that most or all of the criteria discussed in this paper should be part of the
social security reform debate, although many would disagree about their
relative importance. I agree with the Council of Economic Advisors (I997),
who ended its discussion of the economic challenges of an aging population
by concluding that "a variety of approaches [to social security reform]
should be considered, but any possible changes must ... ensure that the
benefits of reduced poverty and increased economic security for the aged
and disabled are not put at risk."
The author would like to thank his Boston College colleagues Eric Kingson
and John Williamson, as well as Olivia Mitchell and Robert Myers, for in-
sightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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Notes
1. As an example, a 1996 Advisory Commission to the Senate Finance Committee
estimated that the official consumer price index overstates changes in the actual
cost-of-living by about 1.1 points per year. Were this estimate adopted by the social
security actuaries and future benefit decreased by this amount, about two-thirds of
today's 75-year deficit would disappear.
2. See Chapter 1 (this volume), Quinn and Mitchell (1996), and Advisory Council
(1997) for the details of these proposals.
3. All other sources of income provided less than 4 percem of aggregate income
for the elderly in 1994. Public assistance, including Supplemental Security Income,
provided less than I percent (Grad 1996). Employer pensions include private pen-
sions and annuities, government employee pensions, and railroad retirement pen-
sions. Some income from pension accumulations may be mislabeled as asset income,
if lump sum pension distributions is invested in financial instruments and their
income then listed under interest or dividends. For a detailed analysis of this issue,
see Woods (1996).
4. The Committee on Economic Security, whose recommendations established
the basic framework for the U.S, social security system, rejected two other ap-
proaches to old-age income security - a noncontributory, universal pension system
funded by general revenues, and a means-tested program (Thompson and Upp
1997), For a discussion of means-testing in the current reform debate, see the chap-
ter in this volume by David Neumark and Elizabeth Powers. For a concise history of
the early decades of the social security program, see Berkowitz (1997) or Bryce and
Friedland (1997).
5. Goodfellow and Schieber (this volume) simulate benefit levels in the future
under various social security reform alternatives.
6. In 1960, the maximum annual OASDJ contribution of the employee and em-
ployer combined was only $288, or about $1,500 in 1996 dollars. [n 1970, the max-
imum was $655, about $2,650 in 1996 dollars (Social Security Administration 1996).
In 1998, the maximum combined OASDI contribution was $8,482, more than a five-
fold increase in real terms since 1960.
7, Estimates of real rates of return in the Old-Age and Survivors components of
social security, net transfers (OASI benefits-OASI taxes paid), and the ratio of bene-
fits to taxes for various types of participants can be found in SteuerJe and Bakija
(1994). The Committee on Ways and Means (1993: 1301-5) has also calculated net
transfers and the ratio of benefits to taxes for men and women retiring in 1980, 1992
and 2000, Finally, Burtless and Bosworth (1997) have estimated internal rates of
return on OASD[ contributions, by birth cohort. All of these estimates tell the same
story -low-wage workers do better than high-wage workers, and early cohorts (those
born in the 1920s and 1930s) have done better than subsequent cohorts will.
8. SteuerIe and Bakija (1994) use a 2 percent real rate of return on alternative
investments. An imernal rate of return from the social security system in excess of
this implies a net transfer to the individual; a rate of return less than 2 percent real
implies a negative transfer - a transfer from the individual to others in the social
security system, The estimates 1 am using adjust for the chances of death before
receiving old age benefits. SteuerIe and Ba~ja also calculate net transfers assuming
sun~val to age 65, and in these calculations the bad news is delayed a bit, but the
trends are the same. See also Mitchell, Geanakoplos, and Zeldes (this volume).
9. Because of the progressive benefit structure, low-wage workers of all types con-
tinue to receive more than a 2 percent real rate of return from the social security
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system, even in 2050. Because of the subsidy in the spousal benefit, single-earner
couples also continue to do well.
10. Leimer (1995) also provides an excellent nontechnical discussion of fre-
quently used money's worth measures, the assumptions behind them, and their uses
and limitations.
II. See the chapter by Martin Holmer (this volume) for simulations of the poten-
tial impacts of social security reform on economic growth.
12. See Hausman and Wise (1985) and Ippolito (1990). Hurd and Boskin (1984)
attributed nearly all of the decline in the labor force participation rates of older
Americans to the generosity ofsocial security. Moffit (1984) is skeptical of the claims,
and points out that aggregate social security wealth rose significantly in the 1950s
(because of increases in coverage; more categories of workers were included in the
system, and they enjoyed large windfall increases in wealth) without any dramatic
declines in labor force participation rates.
13. In fact, the payroll tax is not a pure tax for most workers, since the earnings
associated with the payroll tax increase future social security benefits. As discussed
above, for most current and past retirees, social security has in fact been a substantial
wage subsidy, not a tax, since each dollar of contribmion has generated several
dollars of eventual benefit. For many workers today and in the future, however, this
will not be the case.
14. In 1998, beneficiaries aged 62 to 64 could earn up to $9,120 without losing any
social security benefits. Beyond that, benefits were reduced by $1 for each $2 earned.
For those aged 6.~ to 69, the exempt amount was $14,500, and tlle benefit loss was $ I
for each $3 additional earned. The 1998 exempt amount for those 62 to 64 was
indexed to average earnings in the country. For those 65 to 69, legislation will
increase the exempt amount dramatically, to $30,000 by the year 2002. At age 70,
there is no earnings test, and one can receive full benefits reg-ardless of earnings.
IS. For more discussion of these issues, see Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990),
Quadagno and Quinn (1997) or the Technical Panel (1997).
16. Gramlich (1997) estimates that private saving, calculated from the National
Income and Product Accounts, has dropped by about one-third since the I 960s, as a
percentage of Gross National Product. Aggregate national saving has dropped more
dramatically, from 8.6 percent (during 1962-65) to only 2.0 percent (during 1991-
1994) of GNP, primarily because of the large increases in federal government defi-
cits. At the indivieluallevel, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) estimate that the meelian
level of personal financial assets (excluding- housing and estimated social security
and pension rights) ofhoLiseholds with heads aged 55 to 64 was only $8,300 in 1991.
Trends and issues in national saving are discussed by the Technical Panel (1997).
17. The Council ofEconomic Advisors report (1997) contains a concise discussion
of the effects of social security on saving, elistinguishing among three different time
periods: the start-up phase, the current mature system, and the future.
18. See Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) for
these opposing views.
19. This assumes that individuals do not offset some of the mandated savings
themselves. Bosworth (1996) and Burtless and Bosworth (1997) argue that it is
difficult to use social security accumulations to augment national savings, because, in
practice, the surpluses are integrated into the federal budget and treated like any
other revenue source. This same argument suggests, however, that reducing social
security surpluses, as the Personal Security Account plan proposes, might lead to
Congressional actions to off.set this loss in revenues, and therefore would result in an
increase in national saving.
20. Mitchell (1998) estimated that these aelministrative costs would be at the lower
enel of the one to 20 basis point range.
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21. The Individual Accounts proposals would permit participants to select from a
small number of investment vehicles managed by the government (a TIAA-CREF
model) and would require conversion of the assets to an annuity when they are
claimed. The Personal Security Accounts plan would have indi,~duals invest their
mandated sa,~ngs on their own (a 401 (k) model). within some regulatory frame-
work to be determined, and would permit lump-sum dispersal at or after age 62.
22. The most controversial of the three Advisory Council proposals, the Personal
Security Account plan, would exempt current participants aged 55 or older in 1998
from the basic stnlCl1lral change to a two-tiered system. They would continue in the
current system and would receive the benefits promised under current law, subject
only to changes in retirement ages and benefit taxation that apply to all. Those
under 25 in 1998 would lose any rights under the old system, and receive benefits
only under the new system. Those aged 25 to 54 would receive a combination of their
benefiLs as determined by the current system and the Tier I (flat rate) benefits under
the new proposal, each prorated by the number ofyears spent working in each of the
two systems (Advisory Council 1997).
23. This is the topic of the chapter by.Janice Gregory, in this volume.
24. Grad (1996) reports that only seven percent of aged units in the bottom
income quintile received any employer pension income, and that it amounts for only
three percent of their total cash income.
25. This estimate is based on 1989 data. Mitchell (1992) notes that there was little
change in the percentage of participants in integrated plans between 1985 and 1989.
26. Theoretically, even someone not saving at all could offset the mandate, by
borrowing today to finance the required saving (lea~ng consumption unchanged),
and then repaying the debt when the assets are made available in the haUfe. For
most of those without sa~ngs, however, this avenue is unlikely.
27. Putnam (1995) documents numerous examples of declining civic engage-
ment, in government affairs (declining voter turnout). religious affiliation (declin-
ing church attendance), labor unions (declining membership). ci~c and fraternal
organizations (he cites numerous examples of decline) and even participation in
bowling leagues (down 40 percent between 1980 and 1993, while the total number of
bowlers increased by 10 percent!) Although he does acknowledge some counter-
trends, Putnam concludes that social capital in the United States is eroding.
28. In the Personal Security Account plan, for example, maximum-wage workers,
in the steady-state, are predicted to receive about 80 percent of their total benefits
from the upper tier, compared to only 40 percent for low-wage workers. In the
Indi~dualAccounts plan, with a smaller defined<ontribution part, the analogous
numbers are 40 and 20 percent (Advisory Council 1997).
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